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Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice 
to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of 
contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of 
classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from 
contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. 
The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in 
designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains. 
1.  Introduction	
Supply chain coordination theory is very broad and it covers different aspects of the existing 
relationship between supply chain members. A classification scheme of the coordination literature 
is suggested by Arshinder et al. (2008) and is presented in Figure 1. The scheme shows that, within 
the literature, coordination is approached from various angles from the role of coordination in 
supply chains and coordination across the functions of the supply chain and at interfaces to 
empirical case studies and numerical examples. Furthermore, coordination can be achieved by 
means of coordination mechanisms used to motivate the members of a decentralized setting to 
participate in the optimization of the supply chain network. Among the four coordination 
mechanisms presented in the literature, namely contracts, information technology, information 
sharing and joint decision making, the attention of this paper is directed towards coordination by 
contracts.  
According to Tsay (1999), the supply chain contract is “a coordination mechanism that provides 
incentives to all of its members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves nearly or exactly the 
same as the integrated one”. By specifying contract parameters such as quantity, price, quality and 
deadlines, contracts are designed to improve supplier-buyer relationship.     
 
Figure 1. The focus of review 
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The objectives of these coordinating contracts are (Arshinder et al. 2008): 
-  Optimization of the total supply chain profit 
-  Minimization of inventory related costs of salvage (overstock) and goodwill (shortage) 
-  Fair risk sharing between the parties  
 
Based on the incentives used to motivate the partners, there are different types of coordination 
contracts analyzed in the literature, presented in detail in section 1.2. These contracts, designed to 
achieve coordination in the forward supply chain, can also be extended and applied to achieve 
coordination among members of the reverse supply chain.  
Starting from the general definition of logistics (forward supply chain) - given by The Council of 
Logistics Management – as “the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, 
cost effective flow of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information 
from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer 
requirements”, the reverse logistics (reverse or backward supply chain) can be defined as “the 
process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow of raw 
materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from the point of 
consumption to the point of origin for the purpose of recapturing value or proper disposal” (Rogers 
and Tibben-Lembke 1998).  
Researchers and practitioners have paid a significant attention to coordination contracts on the 
basis of their positive impact on the supply chain performance. In this regard, this paper is 
                                                       
1  Source: Supply Chain Coordination Overview extracted from Arshinder et. Al. (2008), p.318    
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concerned with the overview, classification and interpretation of the literature that addresses the 
forward and reverse logistics based contracts, incentives and coordination. 
2.  Research	highlights	and	objectives	
In relation to the aspects considered in the introductory part, the main aim of this paper is to review 
contracting literature on forward and reverse supply chains, with divided attention towards the 
following objectives: 
-  Review the different types of coordination contracts addressed in the literature; 
-  Understand and appreciate the different types of contracts and their applicability; 
-  Supplement contracting literature by proposing a classification scheme of the existing 
literature having as criteria the level of detail used in building the different contractual 
models/set-ups for both forward and reverse supply chains; 
-  Suggest further research directions by making a parallel between existing study and 
future possible extensions of the theory. 
 
Starting with the review of coordination contracts, the newness aspect of this paper is brought to 
the literature by the proposition of two classification schemes in relation to the applicability of 
coordination contracts on forward and reverse supply chains and by the suggested parallel between 
existing and further research. 
There have been numerous journals used to collect information related to coordination by 
contracts. The publishers particularly used are Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, JSTOR, Emerald, 
Inter Science, Science Direct and Elsevier. Furthermore, the selection of the papers has been made 
based on the addressed issue and according to their content, with focus on: the type of contract that 
receives attention in the analysis, the assumptions and the setting behind the model, the procedure 
followed in generating the data and the formulas and the level of detail and contract applicability. 
In line with the objectives of the research, the rest of the paper is structured as presented in the 
following. Section 3 presents an overview of coordination contracts theory, followed by contract 
classification. Section 4 introduces a classification scheme of the literature based on the 
setting/level of detail adopted when modeling and analyzing the implications of different types of 
contracts on the forward supply chain. In section 5, the applicability of contracts on reverse supply    
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chain theory is considered and classified, ending the paper with concluding remarks and further 
research directions of section 1.6. 
3.  Coordination	contracts	
In this section, the attention is directed on contract characteristics with a closer look at game 
theory, Nash equilibrium and newsvendor model, followed by contract classification and 
evaluation criteria for implementation of contracts. 
3.1 Contract	overview	
Supply chain contracts are used in the business relationship between two or more independent 
participants to the supply chain, as tools for coordination. Game theory analysis plays an important 
role in the decision making process on whether the participants are better off by cooperation or by 
non-cooperation. In the cooperative game the participants’ responsibility is to decide on which 
type of contract is worth implementing and to design the contract in such a way that both players 
are satisfied with the contractual terms. If the parties do not agree on the contractual terms – 
decided by bargaining - then there is no cooperation and the members of the supply chain will be 
rivals in the non-cooperative game (Figure 2).  
A second option for the players, if they do not agree on a contract and still want to cooperate is the 
coalition approach where the concepts of cooperative game theory are applied without a 
predefined procedure to be followed like in the negotiation approach (Guardiola et al. 2007).  
 




2 Figure 2 has been constructed based on information extracted from Albrecht (2010).    
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Starting from the assumption of a monopolistic market, Li et al. (2007) addresses the issue of 
cooperation in a buyer-seller inventory control system. The research methodology used is the 
game theoretical model, where a parallel between the cooperative and the non-cooperative games 
is made. Considering quantity discount as the mechanism used to achieve cooperation, Li et al. 
(2007) studies the impact of cooperative transactions between the members and demonstrates that:  
-  Total system profit is higher at cooperation than at non-cooperation; 
-  The optimal order quantity of the buyer is higher at cooperation than at non-cooperation;  
-  The wholesale price of seller to buyer is lower at cooperation than at non-cooperation. 
Furthermore, Cachon (2003) emphasizes that “A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if 
the set of supply chain optimal actions is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., no firm has a profitable 
unilateral deviation from the set of supply chain optimal actions. Ideally, the optimal actions 
should also be a unique Nash equilibrium; otherwise the firms may “coordinate” on a sub-optimal 
set of actions. In the newsvendor model the action to coordinate is the retailer’s order quantity”. 
And, since the newsvendor model is the ground setting for coordination contracts, a short 
introduction of the model is required. More detailed analysis of game theory applicability in 
supply chain can be found in Cachon and Netessine (2005), Nagarajan (2005) and Nagarajan and 
Sosic (2008). 
The newsvendor model 
The basic newsvendor model (Cachon 2003), also called the newsboy model, consists of two 
firms, a supplier and a retailer facing stochastic demand. The time frame is one selling season and 
the retailer has a single opportunity to replace his inventory. The newsvendor problem the retailer 
encounters refers to the decision on the order quantity q that must be taken before the start of the 
selling season. The demand D>0 has distribution function F and density function f, where F(0)=0, 
        1      	and        . The costs are cs – supplier’s production cost and cr – retailer’s 
marginal cost. The retail price is p and            . There is a goodwill loss for each unit of 
demand the supplier gs or the retailer gr does not satisfy. Alternatively there is a net salvage value 
v for the leftover inventory at the end of the selling season.  
Considering S(q) the expected sales and T the transfer payment from the retailer to the supplier, the 
profit functions can be written as: 
 
                                                     (1) 
                                           (2)    
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The total supply chain profit will be the sum of supplier and retailer profits where            and 
          		  →				∏                                                           (3) 
There is a vast literature on newsvendor model from which Lariviere (2001) is focusing on prices 
and supply chain profit and Chen and Seshadri (2006) focuses on demand risk implications. Other 
extensive treatments can	be	found	in	Nahmias	and	Smith	(1994)	and	Silver et al. (1998). 
In relation to the game theory approach, there is a specific sequence of events that takes place in 
the game, in the case where the parties agree and the retailer accepts the contract offered by the 
supplier. For a better understanding of the supplier-retailer relationship such a sequence of events - 
relative to the time frame - is presented in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Sequence of events within supplier-retailer relation
3 
 
Furthermore, referring to the specific coordination problem and to the contract to be adopted for 
implementation, the sequence of steps to be followed is as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Sequence of steps regarding the decision process of contract implementation
4 
                                                      
3 Figure 3 is a graph representation of the sequence of events presented in Cachon (2003), p.8.    
3.2.  Contract	classification	
As already specified, there are a series of contracts that coordinate the newsvendor setting. These 
contracts can be described based on the different criteria used for classification and on the 
parameters used to create the model.  
A.  Classification based on transfer payments 
As presented in Cachon (2003), optimal 
performance is possible if the participants 
coordinate using transfer payment contractual 
incentives such that every firm’s objective is 
aligned to the supply chain’s objectives. Based 
on this criterion, the existing types of contracts 
are presented in Figure 5 and detailed in the 
following. An overview of the extensive 
models and approaches of coordination by 
contracts, with focus on the most 
representative papers in the literature can also 
be found in Table 1. 
a)  The wholesale price contract 
In this setting, the producer/supplier is selling goods to the retailer at a wholesale price w as time as 
the former agrees to buy the goods at the offered amount per unit. The retailer decides on his 
optimal stocking quantity and sells the goods during the selling season. The retailer keeps the 
entire revenue, but has no possibility of returning unsold items. The transfer payment takes the 
form of:     ,        . The wholesale price contract coordinates the supply chain only if the 
wholesale price is at least equal to supplier’s cost of producing the goods.  
The wholesale price contract is analyzed by Chen and Li (2007) with focus on double 
marginalization and demand distribution, while Dong and Zhu (2006) focus on inventory 
availability within the supply chain and Sabbaghi, Sheffi and Tsitsiklis (2007) focus on the same 
setting where capacity constraints influence the wholesale price. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
4 Figure 4 of steps regarding the decision process of implementing contracts is based on information extracted from 
Cachon (2003), p.5. 
Figure 5. Types of contracts using transfer  
payments criteria of classification    
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A particular case of wholesale contract is the two-part tariff contract. In this case the wholesale 
price charged by the supplier is equal with the production cost. After the end of the selling season 
the retailer pays a fixed franchise fee F to the supplier. This fee is agreed by bargaining before the  
Table 1. Contracting literature (personal contribution) 
   Type of contract  References   Applicability 
1  Wholesale price 
Dong and Zhu (2006), Sabbaghi, Sheffi and Tsitsiklis 
(2007), Chen and Li (2007), Jinghong and Dingti (2008), 
Shin and Tunca (2010) 
Any selling/buying transaction 
2  Two-part tariff  Bonet et al. (2004), Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2007), San 
Martin and Saracho (2010)  Patent licensing 
3  Buyback  Donohue (2000), He et al. (2006), Hou et al. (2010), Höhn 
(2010)  Audio, magazines and book industries 
4  Revenue sharing 
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004), Cachon and 
Lariviere (2005), Chen (2006), Koulamas (2006), Quin and 
Young (2008), Li and He (2008), Dong and Li (2009), Van 
der Rhee et al. (2010) 
Video rental industry 
5  Quantity flexibility 
Tsay (1999), Tsay and Lovejoy (1999), Sethi et al. (2004), 
Brusset (2005), Subramanian et al. (2006), Bassok and 
Anupindi (2008), Lian and Deshmukh (2009), Li et al. 
(2010) 
Cosmetic industry, electronic and 
computer industry 
6  Back-up  Eppen and Iyer (1997)  Fashion industry 
7  Sales rebate  Taylor (2002), Krishnan et al. (2004), Wong (2009)  Hardware, software, auto industries 
8  Quantity discount  Burnetas et al. (2005), Beard et al. (2007), Li et al. (2007), 
Cao et al. (2008) 
Products with long lead times and short 
life cycles: apparel, toys, etc 
   Reviews  Lariviere (1999), Tsay et al (1999), Cachon (2003), Albrecht (2010), Höhn (2010), Wang (2002), 
Gomez-Padilla et al. (2005) 
   Debates  Gerchak and Wang (2004), Arshinder et al (2009a and 2009b), Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Höhn 
(2010), Wang et al. (2007) 
   Newsvendor model  Nahmias and Smith (1994), Silver et al. (1998), Lariviere (2001), Chen and Seshadri (2006), Rekik et 
al. (2007) 
 
demand is observed, assigning all the demand risk to the retailer. The transfer payment is: 
      ,          .   
Regarding the two-part tariff contract Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2007) and San Martin and 
Saracho (2010) focus their attention on patent licensing and royalties within the licensing 
mechanism. 
b)  The buyback contract 
In addition to the wholesale price contract, with a buyback contract the retailer purchases q units 
before the start of the selling season at a price of w, but he can return up to q unsold units to the    
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supplier after the end of the season. The price received from the supplier for the unsold items is the 
buyback price b<w.  
The transfer payment in this setting is:     , ,                     . 
Donohue (2000) studies the coordination in a buyback contract with improving the demand 
forecast information in fashion industry. The impact of supply and demand uncertainty along with 
supply disruption and decision-making under risk on buyback contract is analyzed by Hou et al. 
(2010) while channel stuffing as inventory problem is studied by Wang and Zipkin (2009). 
c)  The revenue sharing contract 
Under a revenue sharing agreement, the buyer pays the supplier a lower wholesale price wr per unit 
purchased. In return, the retailer will share the return realized with the supplier in such a way that 
the retailer keeps a  fraction of the revenue, while the rest of (1-) is the fraction granted by the 
supplier. Assuming that all the revenue is shared, the transfer payment is:  
    , ,           1       1            . 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Li and He (2008) and Dong and Li (2009) are some of the references 
that approach revenue sharing contract on different aspects such as inventory, competition, risk 
adverse retailers, the use of fuzzy variables, etc. 
d)  The quantity flexibility contract 
Within a quantity flexibility agreement, the buyer pays wq per unit purchased. At the end of the 
selling season, the supplier compensates the retailer for the unsold inventory I with a credit equal 
to (wq + cr - v) min(I,q), where  is a contract parameter and  ∈ 0,1 . This type of contract is 
mostly used in electronics and computer industry (Lariviere 1999). 
With the quantity flexibility, the transfer payment is:  
    ,  ,                              
 
       .  
Among the quantity flexibility approaches, valuable work has been done by Tsay (1999), Bassok 
and Anupindi (2008), Lian and Deshmukh (2009) and Li et al. (2010). 
A particular case of quantity flexibility contract is the back-up contract, very similar to the 
buyback contract. Following this agreement, the supplier commits to buy back any unsold    
inventory at the end of the selling season, giving an incentive to the buyer to purchase a larger 
quantity.  
Eppen and Iyer (1997) study the backup agreements and inventory implications within the backup 
setting within fashion industry. 
e)  The sales rebate contract 
In this setting, the supplier’s price is ws  per unit. During the selling season, after the 
accomplishment of a threshold n, the retailer receives a rebate r for every extra unit that exceeds 
the threshold value. The transfer payment takes the form of:  
    ,  , ,      
																																																		   				     ,




Sales rebates contract is analyzed by Taylor (2002), Krishnan et al. (2004) and Wong et al. (2009).  
f)  The quantity discount contract 
Differentiating between the different types of quantity discounts, the attention is drawn on “all 
unit” quantity discount contract. Considering wd(q) the wholesale price charged by the supplier per 
unit, the transfer payment is:      ,              , where the per unit wholesale price decreases 
with quantity q. 
Burnetas et al. (2005) studies the quantity discounts contract with asymmetric demand 
information, while inventory control and buyer-seller cooperation improvement are studied by Li 
et al (1996).  
There can be found numerous reviews on contracting literature such as the ones presented by 
Cachon (2003), Albrecht (2010) and Höhn (2010). Among others, debates and comparisons 
between two or more contracts can be found in Gerchak and Wang (2004), Arshinder et al (2009a 
and 2009b), Cachon and Lariviere (2005) and Höhn (2010). 
B.  Classification based on inventory risk allocation 
Under the consideration that some firms manage to 
avoid carrying the risk of unsold inventory, Cachon 
(2004) suggests a classification of contracts    
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according to the allocation of inventory risk between the members of the supply chain. The 
different types of contracts are as presented in Figure 6. 
a)   Push contracts 
The retailer decides and pre-books quantity q several months before the start of the selling season 
and pays a wholesale price wpull lower than his retail unit price p: wpull <p. Hence, by placing his 
order before having any information on the demand (only observed within the selling season time 
frame), the retailer bears the entire supply chain inventory risk. 
b)  Pull contracts 
The setting is similar with push contracts but in this case the supplier is the one that takes the entire 
supply chain inventory risk because he is the only one holding inventory. The retailer takes no risk 
as he replenishes according to the demand observed during the selling season.  
c)  Advance-purchase discount contracts 
Compared with the previous two contracts that only have one wholesale price, the 
advance-purchase discount contract has two wholesale prices. There is a regular price for goods 
ordered during the selling season while a discounted price is applied for inventory acquired before 
the start of the season. This being the case, the retailer bears the risk of carrying the inventory 
purchased before the demand is observed and the supplier bears the risk of holding inventory 
during the season, ready for any eventual replenishments of the retailer.  
3.3.  Evaluation	criteria	for	contract	implementation	
In order to facilitate the decision on which type of contract is worth implementing, Cachon (2003) 
suggested the following evaluation criteria for contract implementation: 
-  Supply chain coordination, in the sense that the contract must be designed in such a way 
that none of the participants should have the incentive to deviate from  the optimal supply 
chain decisions and actions; 
-  Administrative costs implying that the efficiency of any coordination contract is directly 




-  Risk and benefits sharing as an important feature of any contract that should allow for a fair 
distribution of risk and any division of the total supply chain profit. 
Under the consideration of newsvendor model, the setting allows for observations on the above 
three criteria. It has been shown that most of the contracts achieve coordination and allow for a fair 
division of risk and profits. As concerning the administrative costs, the contracts that imply one 
transaction only are simple to describe and are less expensive. In this regard, wholesale price and 
quantity discount contracts are equally costly, while revenue sharing, buyback and quantity 
flexibility imply a higher investment as the level of detail is higher and additional material and 
informational flows are required. 
In addition to the newsvendor based contractual models, it is worth mentioning that the 
newsvendor model with the retailer choosing his order quantity (optimal Q) can be extended 
according to the degree of liberty the retailer can have in choosing other actions (Cachon 2003) to: 
-  Newsvendor model where the retailer chooses his retail price along with his stocking 
quantity; 
-  Newsvendor model where the retailer is permitted to exert costly effort to increase the 
demand ( i.e. Taylor, 2002); 
-  Newsvendor model where compensation between multiple retailers is possible. 
4.  Overview	of	the	classification	scheme	–	forward	supply	chain	
By specifying precise parameters and decision variables, contracts provide incentives to the 
participants to behave in a manner that provides benefits to the entire supply chain. Based on these 
parameters and on the level of detail adopted in building the contract, the literature can be 




Figure 7. Literature classification scheme within forward logistics (FL) (personal contribution) 
 
 
In generating the overview for contracting literature, there appeared a series of elements to be 
considered in the classification such as: the objective of the contract, the structure of the supply 
chain, the incentive/coordination drive that imposes coordination by contracts, the theory applied 
in analyzing the model, the type of demand and the time horizon. Each of these considerations will 
be presented in this section.  
Contract objective 
According to the scope of contract implementation, contracts can be signed between partners 
having as finality the fulfillment of one or more of the following objectives: performance 
improvement in terms of profit maximization or over/under stock cost reduction (treated by 
Cachon (2003) and by most of the work in the field), facilitation of long-term relationships (Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson  (1993)) and/or risk sharing among the supply chain partners (such as inventory 
risk sharing problem discussed by Yao et al. (2010) and Cachon (2004)). These objectives are 
further discussed in Tsay (1999) and Hohn (2010). 
The structure 
Contracts can be designed in such a way to satisfy the needs of the participants to the game given 
the cases of two-echelon supply chains (with the numbers of participants n and with n = 2) and 
multi-echelon supply chains (with n ≥ 3). Regarding complex structures, Figure 8 is meant to 
clarify the concept of echelon within contracting literature, where the set of all suppliers represents    
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one level of the supply chain, the set of manufacturers represents the second level of the supply 
chain, with the same going for all sets of participants to the chain. The alignment of two sets of 
participants (consecutive or not i.e. supplier – manufacturer or supplier – retailer) that effectuate 
direct transactions with one another is referred to be the two-echelon supply chain, while the 
alignment of multiple sets is called a multi-echelon supply chain.  
Regarding the two-echelon supply chain there are many papers that concentrate their attention on 
the direct collaboration between two individual members, 1-1. This is the case of most of the 
references found in the coordination by contracts literature that investigate the supplier – retailer or 
seller – buyer relation: Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) on price discount, Tsay (1999) and 
Bassok and Anupindi (2008) on quantity flexibility, Pasternack (1985) on buyback, Arshinder et 
al. (2009a) on buyback, revenue sharing and quantity discount contracts, etc.  The  1-n 
collaboration can be found in the work of: Plambeck and Taylor (2002) on quantity flexibility, 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) on price discount, Breinstein et al. (2006) on wholesale price, 
 
Figure 8. One-echelon/multi-echelon versus two level/multi level supply chains (personal contribution) 
 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) on revenue sharing, etc. The n-1 single echelon can be found in 
Gerchak and Wang (2004) on revenue sharing and Bernstein and DeCroix (2006) on transfer 




With regards to the multi-echelon supply chain, recent work can be found in Arshinder et al. 
(2009b) which analyze a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one distributor and one 
retailer. A more complex setting is analyzed by Ganeshan (1999) where multiple suppliers provide 
goods to multiple retailers through one distributor. 
Coordination Drive/Incentives 
As presented in the contract overview part, there can be a series of incentives offered by supply 
chain members to their collaborators in order to achieve coordination. More specifically, these 
incentives can be: price discounts, quantity discounts, quantity flexibility, time incentives such as 
lead times and deadlines, quantity incentives, capacity related incentives or the need for access to 
information such as sales, forecasts and inventory levels (literature presented in section 1.2). 
Methodology approach 
Coordination theory is based on game theoretical approach where the success of one individual in 
making decisions depends on the choices made by the other participants to the game (Myerson, 
1991). In this respect, Cachon (2003) refers to the set of supply chain optimal actions as a unique 
Nash equilibrium and investigates the behavior of different coordination contracts. Albrecht 
(2010) looks at the mechanisms based on non-cooperative game theory and establishment of 
coordinating contracts related to drivers such as quantity, time and lot sizes. Other approaches can 
be found in Cachon (2005), Nagarajan (2005), Taboubi and Zaccour (2005), Guardiola et al. 
(2007) and Hannet and Arda (2008). Fuzzy theory is introduced to coordination contracts by Li and 
He (2008) and Wang et al. (2008) with focus on revenue sharing contract. The simulation 
approach is used in observing the behavior of coordinating contracts under specific settings and 
conditions (Arshinder et al., 2009a).  Kaur, A., Kanda, A. and Deshmukh, S.G. (2006) looked at 
graph theoretic approach implemented on different aspects of supply chain coordination, while 
Arshinder et al. (2009a) apply the concept on quantity flexibility contract as the contract that 
provides best results under specific assumptions.   
Demand approach 
The case of stochastic demand is approached by Cachon (2003) and most of the contracting 
literature. The case of deterministic demand can be found in Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) on the 
wholesale price contract and  Sobel and Zhang (2001), Ding et al. (2007), Qi et al. (2004) and 




The one-period approach is adopted in Cachon (2003) and most of the references presented in 
Table 1. The two-period setting can be found in the work of Cachon (2002) and Linh and Hong 
(2009). Regarding the multi period setting, Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility 
contracts having multiple locations, multiple demand periods, lead times and demand forecast 
updates. 
It has been shown that the contracting literature classified in this section is very broad and covers 
many aspects of the supply chain incentives and coordination, from simple one to one settings and 
simplifying assumptions to very complex approaches. Next section concentrates on classifying the 
literature with respect to the reverse supply chain.  
5.  Overview	of	the	classification	scheme	–	reverse	supply	chain	
In Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (2001) reverse logistics is defined as the movement of products or 
materials from the downstream to upstream with the purpose of creating or recapturing value, or 
for proper disposal. Proceeding further with the research, Tibben-Lembke and Rogers (2002) 
compares and contrasts forward and reverse logistics in a retail environment showing that the 
differences are considerable and cover a wide variety of aspects of logistics from product recovery 
to the sales of remanufactured products. 
While the reverse logistics covers aspects such as product recovery, network design, inventory 
management, production planning and control, remanufacturing, repair, recycling, disposal and 
other related activities, the focus on this section will be on coordination by contracts within 
forward supply chains. Considering all the aspects of the reverse logistics of equal importance, the 
attention is directed only towards the literature that proposes models and contracts that achieve 
coordination between the participants to the reverse logistics game.  
There seem to be a large body of work in the literature regarding reverse logistics. Complete 
overviews can be found in Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (1998), Beullens (2004), Sasikumar and 
Kannan (2008 and 2009) and Subramoniam et al., 2009. However, less importance seem to be paid 
to coordination and, in particular, to coordination by contracts within this area of research. 
Based on the available literature and focusing on the same selection criteria for the papers as in 
forward logistics classification (namely: the type of contract/model that receives attention in the    
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analysis, the assumptions and the setting behind the model, the procedure followed in generating 
the data and formulas, the level of detail and contract/model applicability) a classification scheme 
of the coordination models and coordination by contracts within the reverse logistics literature is 
proposed in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Literature classification scheme within reverse logistics (RL) (personal contribution) 
 
Contract objective 
The main reasons supply chain members engage in reverse logistics is for recapturing value by 
reuse of recycled materials and end-of-live products or for proper disposal imposed by 
government regulations or by customer sensitivity to environmental issues.  
There are two important considerations to be made when it comes to recapturing value from used 
products: product recovery (collection, inspection and separation, disassembly, reuse, 
remanufacturing and recycling) and inventory management. From the very vast literature, 
Melissen and Ron (1999) define the practices and relevant terminology of product recovery, while 
Krikke et al. (1998) looks at the evaluation of product recovery strategies. Recent work on 
inventory management can be found in Mahavedan et al. (2003) on push policy and Hahn et al. 
(2004) on perishable products under LIFO and FIFO policies. Baenas et al., (2011) described that 
the reverse logistics framework will create actions that will not be harming the environment. 
Korchi, and Millet (2011) proposed a framework which allows generating and assessing different 
reverse logistics channel structures and the proposed framework is applied to a product 




The disposal of out-of-use materials (products that cannot be reused) is directly related with waste 
management and environmental implications. In this respect, Sheu (2007) presents a model that 
coordinates the reverse chain by minimization of total reverse logistics costs and risks. Krikke et 
al. (1998) develops a model that optimizes product recovery and disposal considering one product 
category. Other treatments of waste management can be found in Ritchie et al. (2000) on 
pharmaceutical products, Hawickhorst (1997) on nuclear waste, Haastrup et al. (1998) on urban 
waste management and Sharma (2007) on electronic equipment. On the environmental 
perspective,  Bloemhof-Ruwaard et al. (1995) considers the impact of operations research 
techniques on the value of green supply chain management, Zhu and Sarkis (2004) investigates the 
existing relation between economic performance and green supply chain management and 
Vlachos et al. (2007) looks at capacity planning under the consideration of take-back obligation 
and the ‘green image’ impact on customer demand. 
The structure 
The closed loop supply chain, as referred to in Figure 10, is the integration of forward channel with 
the reverse channel having as purpose the achievement of optimal planning and cost reduction. 
Papers that analyze coordination in closed loop systems are Valachos et al. (2007) on take-back 
obligation, Gu and Ji (2008) on remanufacturing cost minimization and Shi and Bian (2009) on 
revenue sharing and quantity discount settings. In an open loop system the products do not return 
to the manufacturer but can be used by different producers in the same or in different industries. 
Zografos and Samara (1989) focus on disposal and routing risks minimization and travel time 
reduction, Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) discuss the economic tradeoffs of selecting the 
optimal reverse chain and Neto et al. (2008) looks at balancing profitability with environmental 




Figure 10. Reverse logistics structure (personal contribution) 
 
The  third-party reverse logistics (3PRL) refer to the reverse logistic taking place through a 
specialized and viable logistics provider instead of the original network (collection centers, 
outsourcing).  References that focus on 3PRL coordination are Ko and Evens (2007), Sasi kumar 
and Kannan, 2008a,b; Sasi kumar and Kannan, 2009; Kannan et al., 2009; Kannan, 2009; 
Farzipoor Saen, 2010; Kannan and Murugesan, 2011 and Du and Evans (2008). 
Coordination drive/incentive 
There have been proposed some models in the literature meant to coordinate the reverse supply 
chain. The incentives used are quantity, time, quality and price/deposit-refund. However, the 
relation of the models with the contractual models existing in the forward supply chain literature is 
limited. In this respect, references to the two-part tariff contract are made by Tirole  (1988) and 
Debo et al. (2002), while Dobos and Richter (2004) look at EOQ and buy-back costs in a 
production-recycling system and Mostard and Teunter (2006) analyze the newsboy problem with 
resalable returns.  More recent researches have been made by Shi and Bian (2009) which analyze 
the aspects of revenue sharing and quantity discount contracts on closed loop supply chain and 
Wang (2009) which studies the coordination with revenue sharing contract under disruption. The 
price/deposit refund incentive, with influence on the quality, quantity and timing of the returns,  
seem to be the most preferred policy in terms of the total cost of accomplishing disposal reduction.  
Papers that focus on deposit refund incentive are Palmer and Walls (1997), Guide and Jayaraman 
(2000) and Savaskan Van Wassenhove (2006). Practical approaches can be found in Raymond 





A game theoretic model has been analyzed by Singer et al. (2003), with focus on quality of the 
disposable items and by Hu et al. (2002) with attention to cost minimization in the case of 
multi-time-step, multi-type perilous waste management. The simulation approach has been 
applied by Kara et al. (2007) on the collection of end-of-life appliances with focus on collection 
costs. 
Demand approach 
The deterministic approach has been studied by Koh et al. (2002), Dobos (2003), Dobos and 
Richter (2004) and Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005).The stochastic approach can be found in 
Minner and Kleber (2001), Hahn et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2007).  
Time horizon 
The one period approach with focus on order quantities is studied by Vlachos and Dekker (2003), 
Ferrer (2003), Robotis et al. (2005) and Zikopoulos and Tagaras (2007). The two period model is 
analyzed by Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) and Webster and Mitra (2007). The multi period 
setting is approached by Kiesmuller and Minner (2003) and Debo et al. (2005). 
6.  Conclusions	and	research	directions	
In line with the objectives of this research, the paper (1) reviews the contracting literature offering 
a classification of coordination contracts and models presented in the literature, (2) appreciates the 
different types of contracts and their applicability and (3) proposes two classification schemes of 
forward supply chain and reverse supply chain based on the level of detail adopted in setting and 
analyzing a specific contract/model. These have been investigated and described in detail through 
sections 2, 3 and 4.  
The outcome shows that where some research has been made on achieving coordination in reverse 
logistics, the reverse supply chain contracting literature is still far behind of the coordination by 
contracts research made within the forward supply chain. Although many models have been 
proposed, there seem to be no direct link to contract applicability in the manner they are applied on 
the forward supply chain. Most of the references considered for the classification of coordination 
within reverse supply chains focus on simple 1-1 structures with less attention paid to 
multi-echelon settings. Furthermore, while simulation approach has been considered to test the    
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coordination models, fuzzy theory and graph theoretical model are theories not considered for 
applicability on reverse logistics.  
It has been observed that the forward supply chain literature presents a high volume of work on 
contract applicability under models with both specific and more relaxed assumptions. The level of 
detail varies from very simple models to very complex ones where coordination among multiple 
actors at different levels of the supply chain can be achieved through contract implementation.  
Contrary to forward logistics, reverse logistics is a relatively new area for researchers and the 
analysis of contract implementation among supply chain members is definitely worth increasing 
attention both in theory and practice, with specific attention to be allocated to the fields covered by 
contracting literature on reverse supply chain versus the fields covered by forward supply chains 
as results from Figure 7 and 9. 
Regarding the findings of this research a parallel can be made between the existing literature on 
coordination contracts and further research directions as visualized in Figure 11, where the 
existing literature refers to the evolution of contracting literature reflecting present situation and 
further study refers to possible ways of extending the literature through future research.  
 
Figure 11. Evolution of contracting literature versus extension possibilities (personal contribution) 
 
When it comes to contract typology, the literature can be extended to include:    
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-  Contracts based on incentives less or not yet considered by researchers such as time and 
information sharing and/or  
-  The introduction of new contractual terms such as the effort made by the participants or 
compensations between multiple members (i.e. multiple retailers).  
This can generate further research on simple forward supply chain along with extended research 
on multi-echelon settings (i.e. the applicability of different contractual agreements between sets of 
members of the same multi-echelon supply chain or the implications brought to the bottom line of 
a member that decides not to participate to the cooperative supply chain game). The literature on 
reverse logistics can be extended by focusing the attention on complex closed and open loop 
supply chains as well as 3PRL. Although there is considerable number of papers proposing models 
with the scope of achieving coordination within reverse settings, less attention is paid to the 
implementation of existing contracts and the applicability of new theories (i.e. fuzzy theory). 
Contracting literature is an interesting area of research with opportunity for further investigations 
on both forward and reverse logistics. However, with the rapid extension of different forward 
supply chains and with the increasing focus on recycling and reverse logistics, the field of research 
seems to remain far behind the progress made by the industry.  
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